Dissapearance of NATO would destabilize both Eastern Europe and Russia

Let's imagine a year 2017 when Donald Trump is the president of US, anti-European populists come to power in Germany and France and Britain falls into isolationism. Is this the happy hour of Russia? These developments would no doubt please the Kremlin but it also entails risks for Russia because without NATO Eastern European states would try to balance Russia. This could create serious instability across Eastern Europe and Russia.

NATO has stabilized Eastern Europe because the overwhelming might of the West was enough to guarantee reasonable security. Without NATO Eastern European states would have two choices, Finlandization and balancing Russia.

Promises and perils of Finlandization

Finlandization got its name after policies Finland adopted during the Cold War. Finland remained neutral and avoided confronting Russia. In return Finland was allowed to remain a capitalist democracy and to engage in lucrative business with Russia. Finlandization is sometimes the approach offered for countries like Estonia.

The problem with Finlandization is that it was probably a unique situation that is hard to replicate. Soviet Union avoided pushing Finland too hard because Finland had fought fiercely during the Winter War so the Soviets had a lot of respect for Finnish threat of military resistance if they were pushed too far. Finland used both political concessions and military deterrent to achieve a certain way of living next to Russia.

After the Second World War Czechoslovakia also tried to maintain some degree of freedom like Finland. It didn't work because communist influence was so strong that in 1948 they just organized a coup to cement their power. When Czechoslovakia tried again in 1968 to become a bit more like Finland in its relations with the USSR, Brezhnev sent in tanks. Czechoslovakia just didn't have Finnish military capacity so Russians felt free to push Czechoslovakia to ever greater concessions.

The same is probably the true with all post-Soviet states. None of them has in the eyes of Moscow a status similar to Finland because they haven't fought their own Winter War against Moscow and thus Russia feels that it can push ever further, until she meets some resistance. An advice to finlandize would probably mean for post-Soviet states an advice to accept ever-greater Russian meddling.

Balancing Russia

The reason why Baltic states like Estonia would be unlikely to finlandize would be decisions taken in Poland and Ukraine. Those nations would quite surely try to balance Russia, thus offering the Baltic states an alternative alliance for protection.

These days both Poland and Ukraine are staunchly anti-Russian. End of Western support would not encourage them to find an agreement with Russia, but would instead encourage a full confrontation with Moscow. Never in centuries has geopolitical situation been more beneficial to balancing the power of Russia, even without NATO. Germany is no longer a threat to Poland. Ukraine's turn to the West in 2014 was a major geopolitical event. Ukraine could have easily fallen for Moscow but instead pro-Western government maintained control over about 90% of pre-war territory and population. Now the anti-Russian alliance of Poland and Ukraine has about 60% or Russian population and about 45% of Russian GDP (in 2015, measured in US dollars). This looks like a solid Russian superiority but the Polish-Ukrainian alliance has to worry only about Russia, while Moscow has several security issues: Syria, Caucasus, China, Ukraine, even the Arctic. Russian power is split, it had four different navies and an expensive nuclear program.

This future Polish-Ukrainian alliance already has a name – Intermarium. This means land between the seas, namely between the Baltic and the Black Sea. The history of Intermarium stretches back to time after the First World War. Back then it didn't work out because too many nations were to be involved in it and Ukraine lost its independence after only a few years. It's different now. The core of the alliance has only two members – Poland and Ukraine, who only have one main problem – Russia. This core Intermarium would be strengthened by cooperation with other nations like Romania or Sweden.

Geography is here the key. For the first time in 500 years Poland is no longer a direct neighbor with Russia. Between Poland and Russia are Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad is cut off from mainland Russia as long as Lithuania remains independent. This makes Lithuanian independence very important for Poland and gives Lithuania a secure place in the Intermarium alliance. Latvian independence helps to secure Lithuania and to cut Russia off the Baltic Sea, so Latvia can also count on Polish support, but less. Estonia is even further in the north than Latvia and is thus less vital for Polish security. This means Estonia has to work even harder to achieve  protection of the Intermarium.

Domination of the Baltic Sea

Poland would inevitably try to neutralize the Russian fleet on the Baltic Sea. Russian fleet's main base in Baltiysk in Kaliningrad is within range of Polish artillery so the Poles can consider this problem to be under control. The second port of the Russian navy is in Kronstadt in the Gulf of Finland. Before WW2 Estonia and Finland had plans to block the gulf so that Soviet navy couldn't get out of the gulf. It didn't work back then because in 1939 Estonia decided not to fight. It didn't turn out well for Estonia back then so now Estonia has decided to fight for her freedom.

There are currently no known plans to block the Gulf of Finland. NATO doesn't need to do it, it's strong enough to defeat the Russian navy in the Baltic Sea, thus keeping the sea open to supply the Baltic states. Intermarium on the other hand would find blocking the Gulf of Finland the easiest way of keeping Russian navy out of the Baltic Sea.

Doing it would force Estonia to spend heavily on the navy. Estonia would need to develop mine laying capacity and would also probably need land- or shipbased anti-ship missiles. Developing those capacities will drive Estonian defense spending way above the current level of 2% of GDP. Also, all Baltic states would need to strenghten their anti-aircraft capacities and land forces. This will easily drive defense spending in all three states to 3% of GDP or even higher.

Destabilyzing Russia

That's not the end. For balancing Russia Intermarium would probably try to weaken Russia by supporting anti-Russian forces. This would for instance mean giving anti-aircraft MANPADS, like the Grom system, to opposition forces in Syria. West has so far avoided it, because there is a danger terrorists could use it against civilian planes, but Intermarium is not going to worry too much about a few planeloads of dead German turists. War in Ukraine has already killed thousands and the events between 1930-1950 killed millions of Ukrainians and Poles. This hangs heavily on decisionmakers in Warsaw and Kyiv.

Intermarium would also arm and finance anti-Russian forces in Caucasus and would try to establish a contact with Chechnya's strongman Ramzan Kadyrov who has a large private army. Intermarium would also be tempted to support Taleban in Afghanistan in the hope that Taleban's win will destabilyze the whole Central Asia, thus creating another nightmare for Russia. And Intermarium would support every Chinese attempt to capture Russian lands east of the Urals.

Despite Russian claims NATO hasn't tried to destabilize and divide Russia, mostly out of fear of what might happen to Russian nuclear weapons in case of Russian collapse. Intermarium on the other hand would be glad to see Russian collapse because it would diminish Russian threat to them. The weak and the strong behave differently. NATO is so strong that it can think about the longe term dangers of Russian instability. The weak can't afford such luxury because if they get their policy wrong the weak may have no "long term" to worry about. Memories about loss of independence are very vivid in Intermarium. Countries of Intermarium will anyway think that after Russian collapse nuclear weapons will remain in the hands of state actors and even if terrorists get them, those nukes are unlikely to be used against Intermarium countries.

For the Baltic states costs of Intermarium may not be limited to higher defense spending. Intermarium countries at the Baltic Sea are much richer then those on the Black Sea. Russia on the other hand is applying most pressure on the poorer countries on the Black Sea. This requires financial support of the richer Poland and Baltic states to poorer Ukraine and maybe Georgia to build up their infrastructure and militaries. In fact, the richer countries of Intermarium would need to copy some of the policies of EU that they have so benefited from. Those costs would also be significant. For Estonia both increase of defense spending and support for Ukraine may need an additional 2% of GDP. If there would be a Russian arms buildup near the Baltic states of if Russia would seriously attack Ukraine those extra costs may become even greater.

Going nuclear

Intermarium may achieve a conventional deterrent against Russia but will remain vulnerable to Russian nuclear blackmail. The only way out is getting an independent nuclear deterrent. Ukraine has some know-how and Poland has money so their nuclear path could be quite fast. To speed things up they might team up with other nuclear countries like North Korea, Iran or Pakistan.

Even a few nuclear warheads might give Intermarium an effective nuclear deterrent. They are of course very far from a credible second strike capacity but Ukraine is so close to Russia that Intermarium would not need nuclear submarines for deterrent. Several large Russian cities, including Moscow, are so close to Ukraine that Intermarium could target them with nuclear warheads delivered either in short-range missiles or fighter jets. Even a small probablity of losing a major city to a nuclear strike will make Moscow think twice about its nuclear threats and that's already something of a deterrent.

For the Baltic states all this would be just another terrible dilemma. Baltic states are way too small for any nuclear deterrent so they would prefer a Finnish policy of fighting a serious conventional war while ignoring Russian nukes. Poland and Ukraine would think of nuclear weapons mostly because those weapons are available to them. Baltic states would need to decide how they would react to Polish and Ukrainian nuclear weapons because being allied with them would make them targets of Russian nukes. Would Estonia be willing to have Polish nukes here so Poland could target St Petersburg? Even switching sides won't help because if the Baltic states would be allied with Russia then Russian bases in the Baltics would be tempting targets for Polish nukes.

How to avoid this bleak scenario?

If the West would withdraw from Eastern Europe at least some developments discussed in this article are likely to take place. No Western pressure on Poland and Ukraine is likely to stop those developments because pressure would be seen just as another indication that the West is an unreliable partner and that thus Intermarium needs an independent deterrent against Russia.

Continuation of current policies of NATO and EU would be great, because they help to solve Eastern Europe's security issues without the destabilizing effects of balancing Russia. If US would drop out of NATO there still are several things Europe can do. Europeans can strenghten the European pillar of NATO, they can keep EU operational and the sanctions against Russia in place.

EU sanctions against Russia are here an important milestone. If EU would drop the sanctions against Russia without serious improvement of the situation in Ukraine Eastern European nations like Poland could feel like they now have to respond with measures of their own, like direct military support to Ukraine with lethal weapons. If that would take place then it will be a sign that my warning of an independent Eastern European security policy would be becoming true.

After Brexit the Special Relationship is next to go

Photo: Andres Putting, Delfi

Britain decided to leave the European Union so that the British would no longer have to pay for building Polish roads and would no longer have to accept Poles in UK. When will a time come when they will decide that they no longer want to pay to protect Poland from Russia?

It has no impact on NATO, everybody repeated after the British referendum on EU membership. In the short run it may be true but in the long run I'm afraid that the Special Relationship (SP) with US will go and UK will cease to play an oversized role in NATO.

UK has been moving the same direction as other Western European countries, like Netherlands, that have been cutting their defense spending. US spends 3,6% of its GDP on defense, but it gets in return the mightiest military in the world. This gives US a lot of clout in the world and gives Americans that feeling of a special nation that they desire. Netherlands, on the other hand, spends 1,16% of GDP on defense. This gives them only a token military, but they don't need more because they live in a very quiet neighborhood. If they would choose to spend 3,6% on military like the Americans it would be just as exhausting for the economy but Netherlands would never get anything near the influence that spending gives the Americans. So why bother with military?

UK was spending around 2% of GDP on military in 2015 but this percentage has been declining for years. It's not just about saving money but also about changing mentality. 

After losing the empire UK started searching for a global role and found it in Special Relationship. It gave London more clout and this special feeling of being important. UK was a major power in Europe during the cold war and remained important in former colonies in Africa. 

Yet over time things changed. End of the Cold War left the feeling that security issues have been mostly solved. Tony Blair's attempt to strengthen the SP by going to war in Iraq next to Americans left a bitter taste. Brits were getting the feeling that defense spending doesn't really justify itself. This was no longer about the anti-war left because the Tory government of David Cameron also ruthlessly cut defense spending. 

A clear mentality change has been taking place. British elite has difficulty understanding what military is for because they no longer think like a great power, but as a great trading nation. For instance, there was a surprising discussion about whether Britain should renew its nuclear deterrent because it was deemed too expensive. They discussed it with all seriousness in a world where several potentially hostile nations want nuclear weapons and several others already have them. UK is building two big aircraft carriers but there is some confusion whether they will actually have any aircraft on them. Budget cuts were so bad that US president Barack Obama had to threaten Cameron that he calls SP finished when UK cuts defense spending below 2% of GDP. We have several signs that the British people and also the British elite no longer consider defense important and don't understand why would they need to pay for it. 

So imagine now that post-Brexit UK has slow growth and a growing budget deficit, yet they still need to keep defense spending at 2% or the Americans will get angry at them. When will a time come when the British will decide that SP just isn't so important to them and that they would rather work harder on those trade agreements with India and China? If this moment comes it will be because of social development in the UK that has been taking place over the years. British euroscepticism also built up over the years, yet most people didn't believe that a decision to leave the EU was really possible. 

The end of the Special Relationship would probably be triggered by an external crisis where US would ask British help but the British would think about it and decide that they actually don't want to get involved. This almost happened in 2013 when the British parliament didn't want to attack Syria. If it happens again the fallout might be much bigger. Once the SP is finished one can expect British defense spending to fall rapidly and then it's all finished and Britain has again become trading nation on a small island. 

A lesson from Estonia - fighting corruption in Ukraine takes time

Edgar Savisaar, the mayor of  Tallinn, is suspected in
taking bribes and also in taking money form Russia.

Those who are worried about the level of corruption in Ukraine should understand that it takes time to fight it. More than grand announcements Ukraine needs to liberalize it's economy, strengthen democracy and build institutions.

In 2015 Estonian score in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index was 70, while the cleanest country, Denmark, scored 91 out of 100. Estonia is the highest scoring ex-communist country and has better score than Portugal, Spain or Italy. Ukraine on the other hand scores just 27 points, indicating a high level of corruption. Ukraine is on a par with countries like Iran, Nepal, Nicaragua and Paraguay. Ukraine is even more corrupt than Russia. So one would expect that Estonia has a lot to teach to Ukraine about fighting corruption.

Soviet Union was a corrupted place but it wasn't as bad as Ukraine or Russia now. When it imploded in 1991 Estonia and Ukraine went different into different directions - Estonia become less, Ukraine more corrupted.

In the beginning in Estonia it wasn't really about fighting corruption, but about liberalization to join the West. The push for liberalization also helped to limit corruption. Liberalization itself was about efficiency and modernization because a minimalist state was easier to run.

Corruption in politics and public sector remained a serious issue in the 90s. Privatization scandals were common. Tiit Vähi, a prime minister in the 90s, lost his job because one corruption scandal. Once he was no longer in politics he turned out to be an owner of a large company called Silmet that was privatized while he was in office. Nothing happened about this or other major corruption scandals of the 90s. The politicians were untouchables. The prosecutors office was under political influence. The internal security service Kapo was operating at least partly outside of the law.

It got better when Estonia joined the European Union. Estonia had strengthened law enforcement and in the decade between 2000-2010 there were several corruption cases against civil servants. Convictions in corruption cases were no longer rare.  In 2008 25 traffic police officers of Harju county were convicted in taking bribes. Before it anti-corruption officials had in two major operations charged dozens of traffic police officers of Harju county for taking bribes. After they all were indicted the Harju county that includes the capital Tallinn for some time had almost no functional traffic police because most previous officers were waiting for trial for corruption.

In 2010 Villu Reiljan, a former minister of environment, was convicted in corruption. He was the first former minister in Estonia who was convicted for a crime he committed in office. It took 19 years of independence to convict someone of his stature. In 2014 he was once more convicted for corruption for a crime he committed as minister. He is now once more indicted for a third case of corruption, this time for intermediating a bribe.

Yet corruption remains a serious issue. Everything associated with cars is still rife with corruption. It is still possible to buy a driving license or pay your way through vehicle inspection even though corruption is in these days more hidden than before.

It was only in this decade that Estonia started seriously tackling political corruption. In 2012 there was a major scandal about funding of the ruling Reform party. There were several scandals about influence peddling, also often about the Reform party. Then in 2015 leader of the Center party, Edgar Savisaar, was charged with corruption for taking bribes as a mayor of Tallinn.

So why did it take so long in Estonia to fight political corruption and what has made fighting corruption possible now? It's about several actors working in tandem. The first is development of law enforcement agencies that prioritize fighting corruption and are no longer afraid of targeting politically influential people. Building up such capacities takes time.

The second is political pluralism. The dominant Reform party and Center party have attempted to manipulate rules in their favor and to cement their hold on power with public money. Yet their power has always been limited because all governments have been multi-party governments. This matters. When the state prosecutor Heili Sepp started investigating Reform party finances in 2012 the Reform party was very vicious in their criticism of her and they didn't deny their desire to destroy her career. They didn't succeed because she was able to work in institutions not controlled by the Reform party.

It also helps to have a free press and outside actors independent of political power. The Autorollo scandal that forced the former minister of foreign affairs Keit Pentus-Rosimannus (also from the Reform party) to leave office was uncovered by a businessman who lost money in the bankruptcy of the trucking company Autorollo. It was an investigation financed by him that uncovered a lot of dirty details and clear signs of influence peddling in the wheeling and dealing around that company that cost the tax-payer 325 000 euros.

Ukraine has the benefit of a strong civil society that is pushing for reforms. Emergence of a strong political force that campaigns against corruption has always been important in fighting corruption. The anti-corruption fighters in Ukraine should avoid pushing for individual indictments and concentrate on building efficient institutions. An anti-corruption agency would be great, it has worked well in Latvia and Romania. Yet the best cure against corruption is a well functioning modern state that no longer has any soviet pockets nowhere in public administration.

Why ageing revolutionaries in Eastern Europe hate migrants, cyclists and vegetarians

Jaroslaw Kaczynski Photo: Piotr Drabik

Eastern Europe recently got a lot of bad press in the West because authoritarian and anti-liberal politicians won elections in one country after another and started rolling back the liberal political order, often with little opposition from the society. Then Donald Trump happened in the US and suddenly Eastern Europe doesn't look so bad. Yet it still needs an explanation why are we seeing such a backlash to a liberal, globalized world in Eastern Europe.

What we have here is a conflict between globalization and political transformation in Eastern Europe. After the Berlin Wall fell Eastern Europe experienced a transformation from communism to capitalism, from autocracy to democracy and from a closed society to an open society. The digital transformation also took place at the same time. Yet the most important transformation taking place in Eastern Europe now is one of globalization. The anti-liberal movement in Eastern Europe is mostly an anti-globalization movement.

The anticommunist revolutionaries in Eastern Europe probably didn't imagine that after communism their countries would become part of a globalized world. They often wanted to resurrect a pre-war conservative, agrarian society as they imagined it. This imagination was often very romanticized. Those revolutionaries also thought that their country should be a part of a wider Europe, but their understanding of that Europe was also very romanticized. Their knowledge of Western Europe often came from literature, like the Agatha Christie novels.

The post-communist reality came as a shock. The old, pre-war agrarian Eastern Europe didn't come back from the dead. The globalized, multicultural Western Europe also wasn't what the revolutionaries in Eastern Europe imagined it would be. Yet the revolutionaries, now in power, thought that they can strive to achieve Western level of prosperity without copying parts of their societies they didn't like. The revolutionaries said to their people that "we don't need to copy their every folly" and tried to forge a special path for their countries.

Yet over time weird things started happening in Eastern Europe. Young people started going to Africa to work as volunteers. One vegetarian restaurant was opened after another and they were followed by vegan restaurants. Young men started growing ridiculous looking beards and started cycling. Western follies started arriving to the East.

The aging revolutionaries started striking back. Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski told the German newspaper Bild:

The previous government carried out a leftist programme there (in the public media). It was as if the world was according to a Marxist model which has to automatically develop in one direction only - a new mixture of cultures and races, a world made up of cyclists and vegetarians who only use renewable energy and fight all forms of religion.

Waszczykowski railed against cyclists and vegetarians because they were already in Poland. He and his friends consider it to be a foreign, non-Polish import that has to be stopped. It's a culture war between a conservative and a globalized world.

In this culture war the Eastern European conservatives get most of their inspiration from American conservatives. Much is talked about Vladimir Putin's Russia's attempts to influence Europe with his anti-globalization, anti-liberal initiatives, but Russia's actual influence isn't that great. US has managed to supplant Russia's intellectual position in Eastern Europe in only a few decades. Eastern Europe is still influenced by old conservative ideas like dislike of homosexuality or anti-Semitism, that stem from the communist or pre-war time, but even there one can find similar influential ideas that stem from the US.

In 2015. the refugee crisis made anti-globalization the main issue in Eastern Europe. This region has won a lot from opening up to the world but the scope of change is just too fast for too many. The anti-globalization crowd is often described as the people who didn't get a piece of the growing prosperity of Eastern Europe. That's only partly true. While some people did lost big during the transformation, most people in that part of Eastern Europe that is now part of the European Union have now a much higher standard of living than 30 years before. That is also true of pensioners and low income workers.

The biggest reason for this anti-globalization movement is the cognitive difficulty of understanding modern world. The people who are now 50+ in Eastern Europe grew up and got their education in a very different world. After the transition they had to learn how to get by in a capitalist democracy. They had to learn to use computers, to speak English and to acquire all kinds of skills needed to thrive in this new world. For a grown-up this was hard, but most people managed to do it sufficiently well.

Yet their societies, instead of slowing down, started changing even faster. Instead of laying back and enjoying what they had achieved these middle-aged people were forced to witness discussions about gay marriage and accepting foreign refugees. Nothing in their lives had prepared them for those discussions. It looked like big change in society and previous experience had shown that big change in society is often problematic and sometimes outright dangerous. Being suspicious and resisting change seems for them like a wise stance.

For young people it's very different. They were raised in a new world and often know very little about communism. Young people have difficulty understanding why their societies are so much more conservative than Western societies. The young are impatient to move on much faster so that their societies would not only be as rich as the West, but also as liberal as the West. Of course that also means bicycle lanes, vegetarian restaurants, craft beer, other cultures, renewable energy and gay marriage. For the young, the East must have everything that the West has.

Not all old people in Eastern Europe are not conservative and not all young people are liberal, but there is definitely a serious generational fight taking place in Eastern Europe right now. This conflict gets very little coverage in the West, which is a pity, because the existing analysis in the West too often turns to some old atavistic impulses to explain Victor Orban or Jarosław Kaczyński.

Seeing the current turmoil in Eastern Europe as a fight of generations also tells us how it will end. The young, who are liberal, will win. No matter what the conservatives say - there is no deep cultural tradition behind conservative ideas in Eastern Europe. It's just a reaction to the world that is changing too fast.

Baltic states are bigger than you think

"Small", "tiny" or even "minuscule" are the adjectives often used to describe the Baltic states separately or even all of them together. It's true that in most respects those adjectives are correct, but when it comes to military defence, Baltic states are much bigger than you think.

Are Baltic states defensible, analysts often asked prior to their NATO accession. Recently two studies, one from Sweden and the other from Finland, raised the same question and they didn't think the Baltic states can defend themselves and neither can NATO help them. Nevertheless, I think they are too pessimistic. 

There is one nightmare scenario frightening everyone -- Russia suddenly attacks all three Baltic states, swiftly suppresses resistance, establishes a land connection to its Kaliningrad enclave and takes defensive positions against Poland in Southern Lithuania and in the Baltic coast against NATO navies. This would present NATO with a fait accompli, allowing Moscow to start negotiations from a position of strength.  But how likely is this scenario?

So how big are the Baltic states?

Russia has to invade suddenly to have a chance. This presents a serious problem for Russia. It has long borders and thus has to keep a large part of its forces in the Far East and in the Caucasian mountains. Only a part of its forces can be in Western Russia. But due to its huge size even the forces in Western Russia have to travel a long road before reaching Baltic borders. Logistics will be a big issue for Russia.

On the other hand Baltic states are much bigger than any war theater where Russia has fought during the last 20 years. Russia fought two difficult wars in Chechnya, but Baltic states have a combined population that is 6 times bigger that that of Chechnya and a territory 10 times as large. South Ossetia has the population and territory of a larger Estonian county, no more.

Occupying a region of about 6 million (mostly hostile) people requires plenty of infantry. To have one soldier for 100 inhabitants requires 60 000 troops and this is just for keeping the territory under control. Russia probably could gather this army, but it will take time and it's impossible to do it discreetly. 

So Russia can attack only with troops in the vicinity of Baltic states. We are talking about some brigades here, the amount of infantry that Russians have at their disposal is limited, but they have attack helicopters, earth-to-earth missiles, artillery, etc. Russians have plenty of firepower to overpower Baltic armies in a desert fight, but not enough to effectively control Baltic states for the initial days or even weeks.

How the Baltic states intend to defend themselves

But Baltic states are anything, but deserts. In fact, Estonia and Latvia are very wet places, full of swampland and thick forests. There are only some major roads and they often pass through forests, severely limiting the maneuverability of Russian armor. But without armor Russians don't have anything. Lithuania has a more open terrain, but in Lithuania population centers are bigger.

So even if there would be no resistance, Russians could only establish a few bases in all three countries, while most of the countryside and even some large towns would remain outside Russian control because Russians just don't have enough infantry to properly occupy these countries. Troops to establish Russian presence in smaller towns and villages have to be transported from other parts of Russia or even mobilized and it may take several weeks until they arrive.  

Armies of the Baltic states are not very strong, the three countries have made little actual plans for mutual defence and their defense solutions are also different. For example, Latvia is not really planning serious defence of its territory, Latvian soldiers don't even have suitable uniforms for Latvian climate, but use desert uniforms that are meant for Afghanistan. Estonia on the other hand is preparing mostly for defending its territory and has kept conscription, to allow swift mobilisation of soldiers in case of war. Official numbers are somewhat exaggerated, but Estonia still has the capacity to mobilize some 10-15  000 men, maybe up to 20 000 men. Their training and motivation are better than that of Russians, but there may be a shortage of both modern weapons and ammunition. 

I'm now assuming that Russians win all battles, but I still claim that victory won't be easy. Baltic states are just too big to be invaded rapidly. Blowing up bridges, laying mines and making small ambushes will be enough to slow Russian advance and to inflict casualties. The shortest roads from the Russian border to Tallinn and Riga are about 200 kilometers, and as I said before, there are only a very limited number of roads Russians can use. This makes stalling and blocking their advance quite easy without ever winning a battle. Clearing minefields, removing obstacles and fighting the defenders while they do it may take several days even if Russians win all battles.

There is of course the possibility of sending an air-born or sea-born invading party to take control of strategically important places like government offices in Tallinn or Riga. Nevertheless, Russians still have to establish a land connection to the invading force because otherwise they may remain stuck and get wiped out by local troops. And taking over some government quarters in capitals don't give power over the countries because all three countries are covered with units of local paramilitary organizations Kaitseliit, Zemessardze and KASP. These are also different in all countries, but they do establish a certain military presence in all corners of the Baltic states, making occupation of Baltic states very complicated. 

So let's imagine that after the Russians have reached Tallinn and Riga Estonian and Latvian troops manage to stop Russians for a few days. Russians will soon need to get more ammunition and supplies from Russia and to send the wounded and dead back to Russia. But the supply line is 200 kilometers long and in hostile territory.

This is where the importance of the paramilitary forces really become obvious. They are usually considered an auxiliary force by most foreign analysts, but local military planners give them a much more important role, and recently in Estonia also more money and better weapons.

Kaitseliit in Estonia has a penchant for small unit, guerrilla warfare not because military commanders want it (they don't), but because this is what the volunteer fighters prefer. But having plenty of small units of local men who know each other, terrain and are well armed is not something a foreign commander wants in its rear. Paramilitary units have the potential of making resupplying of troops fighting near Tallinn or Riga a very complicated business. Russians have a very limited amount of roads they can use, there are plenty of forests for paramilitaries to hide and plenty of bridges Russians have to protect. And the defensive units become themselves targets for paramilitaries, so those units can't be too small. It's anybodies guess how many troops Russians would need to secure the 200 km road from Narva to Tallinn, but believe it or not, we are already talking about strategic depth here.

How fast will help arrive?

There are some pessimistic estimates about how fast NATO could send help to Baltic states. One month, maybe even three months are the guesses. But it's probably too pessimistic. It may take a month or more to send a big military unit to Baltic states, but the Baltics are mostly in need of a strong navy and plenty of air-power.

Sweden has promised to help the Baltic states in case of an attack and from Swedish airfields allied jets could engage the Russians in a matter of days, maybe even hours. The same goes for Swedish navy and German navy isn't that far either. If allied jets and ships would clear the sky and the sea from Russians, then that would be pretty much the end of the war. This would allow the resupplying the Baltic troops and there would be little need for land troops, except maybe for some tanks.

Poland in the south

Estonia intends to fiercely defend itself, but the most important battles will take place in Southern Lithuania. Russians need to establish a land corridor from Kaliningrad to Belarus and there is only one road in Southern Lithuania for it. They need to capture it. In the town of Mariampole this road from Kaliningrad to Belarus crosses the only road from the Baltic states to Poland. Therefore, Mariampole is  strategically the most important point in the Baltic states.

But Mariampole is quite close to Poland. There's little doubt that the Polish would come to the aid of the Baltic countries and they have the military capabilities that far exceed anything the Baltic states have. So Russians also have to find resources to take on Poland. And all that without getting caught before they attack.

Frankly, I don't see how Russia could swiftly occupy the Baltic states and present NATO with a fait accompli. Baltic states are just too big for it.

This article was originally posted at my other blog in 2011. 

So what if Russia can conquer a few roads in the Baltics within a few days?

Estonian army firing a Javelin anti-tank missile. Photo: mil.ee

Another bleak assessment of NATO's ability to protect the Baltic states from a Russian aggression was published today. Foreign Policy has a short version of it, Rand Corporation has published a longer one.

This analysis gets the basic geopolitics right. It assumes Belarus will remain neutral and thus an attack against Lithuania is unlikely. It also assumes Sweden will allow NATO to use her territory but won't get involved herself. Now the weak part.

What about Kaliningrad?

This analysis doesn't see Russia establishing a land corridor to the Kaliningrad enclave. Yet establishing that corridor would be a major goal of any Russian attack against the Baltic states. If this analysis saw that Russia can't establish that corridor then they have just established that Russia has a big unsolved problem when they think about attacking the Baltic states.

Russia inevitably has to think about Kaliningrad in such a scenario. What if NATO tries to conquer it? Or simply to bomb all the infrastructure in Kaliningrad to rubbish while defenders run out of ammo? And how will they solve the long term supply problem of Kaliningrad if Lithuania remains independent and hostile to Russia and NATO rules the Baltic sea?

Baltic states are bigger than 3 roads

Now, let's look more closely to what is Rand predicting. Rand's analysis assumes that Russian forces can get to the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga within 60 hours or faster. That's actually not very much. There are few major Latvian or Estonian city's on those roads. Large areas of Estonia and Latvia would remain effectively outside Russian control even then. I'm not talking about isolated villages but about cities with hospitals, factories, ports and even small international airports.

Estonia and Latvia have a combined territory of more than 100 000 km2. Rand doesn't specify how big those 22 Russian battalions are but let's assume they are 1000 men each. That's 22 000 men to control a territory of more than 100 000 km2 with more than 3 million people. There's no way Russians can establish anything similar to an occupation regime with such a small force even when there would be little resistance. Rand actually stops that analysis halfway because in addition to conquering the capitals Russians have to move 200 more kilometers to Ventspils and Liepaja, while they have 300 km of hostile territory to conquer between the roads that lead to Riga and Tallinn. Do you see on the map below the large unconquered territories in Southern Estonia and Western Latvia? Russia would need large additional forces to capture those territories.

Russian attack as seen by the Rand Corporation

Local conditions and defences

Rand criticizes the Estonian and Latvian battalions which are "extremely light, lack tactical mobility, and are poorly equipped for fighting against an armored opponent". So why haven't the Baltic states invested more in armor when they know they have to face heavily armored Russian army?

This is partly so because 10 years ago NATO told the Baltics to get rid of conscription and stop planning for a war against Russia that NATO considered impossible. Latvia and Lithuania did exactly that and now Latvia especially is militarily much weaker than the size of her population and GDP would allow. 

The other reason is that the Baltic states have developed armies meant to fight Russia in local terrain in local conditions. This means Baltic armies are not much worth in a fight in a Middle Eastern desert but on home terrain they are much stronger. 

Firstly, it's hard to understand why anyone would call them poorly equipped for fighting against an armored opponent. All Baltic armies have powerful anti-tank weapons: Estonia and Lithuania have Javelins, Latvia Spikes. Recent years have brought large additional purchases of powerful anti-tank weapons. 

What about limited mobility that led to destruction of whole units in that war game? The study notices that the terrain in the Baltic states is varied with open terrains, forests and wetlands. What they don't notice that the Baltic states are not a random patchwork of fields, forests and wetlands but that forests and wetlands tend to cluster in some areas, thus creating choke points where attacking armored units don't have much space to manoeuvre. 

One such choke point is in Eastern Virumaa where Russians can cross the Narva river only in a 10-km stretch of land north of Narva because to the south of Narva there are large wetlands on both sides of the river. The other is in Tartu, where two large lakes, a river, two large wetlands and a city create a large defensive barrier. Tallinn is bolstered to the east by a 200km belt of forests and swamps. In Latvia crossing the river Daugava would be a serious challenge. 

One should not forget that the Baltic states are not in a desert. Forest plays an important part in the defences of the countries. I have always seen Estonian army training defence either in forest or with their backs against forest. The logic is simple - armored units struggle in a forest so defenders can always simply escape to the security of the forest to avoid destruction. These local conditions have convinced the local commanders to prefer light infantry units with powerful anti-tank weapons over small armored units. 

Paramilitaries

All three Baltic states have paramilitary units. Western analysts often don't seem to understand why they are necessary, while Estonia is prioritizing them. NATO has almost no similar units to Estonian Kaitseliit but NATO know well a similar organization - Afghanistan's Taleban. Estonia's Kaitseliit has pretty much the same goal as Taleban - it is a force that is made to deny the opponent control of the territory. In fact Estonia has already done most of the things Rand advises in another policy paper on unconventional defense. 

Kaitseliit is a decentralized organization units of which are meant to function in isolation if necessary. Yet it has much better weaponry than Taleban ever had, for instance Kaitseliit is promised to get at least some Javelin missiles that Estonia recently bought. It is also meant to decentralize the question of war and peace. Rand's study questions whether the Baltic states should keep fighting after the initial Russian success. Yet in war the different units of Kaitseliit are meant to be almost independent of the central control so they will cease to fight when they want it, not when the government in Tallinn orders them. 

Conclusion

Rand's study is right to say that the balance of forces in the Baltic region is not in NATO's favour but I'm not sure if it's so clearly in Russia's favour as they say. Baltic states need support but they need advanced weapons more than large land units. If NATO can guarantee dominance in the air and in the Baltic sea that in itself would be an almost decisive advantage. Additional anti-aircraft and armored units would also help but I doubt if it actually takes 7 brigades to secure the Baltic states. 

Russia is indeed strong in the Baltic region but I'm not sure if it is right to call the current situation Russian superiority. It would be more correct to call it an absence of balance. We really have no idea of knowing how a war in the Baltic states would develop. 

A weak hand may not deter Russia from attacking

Border between Estonia and Russia in Narva

Wars start not because at least one side has a good plan for winning it but because at least one side feels a need to fight. This is something that Western analysts often don't understand, because they are fooled by the Powell doctrine.

The Powell doctrine has become an integral  part of Western strategic thinking, but applying it to Russia will just fail. That's bad, because without anything like the Powell doctrine keeping Russia in check war between NATO and Russia becomes much more probable than people usually think.

The Powell doctrine asks a few questions and tells a country to go to war only when the answer is a "Yes" to all questions.

1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?

2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?

3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?

4. Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted? 

5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?

6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?

7. Is the action supported by the American people?

8. Do we have genuine broad international support?

Thinking according to the Powell doctrine misled the West first in Ukraine and now in Syria. In Ukraine Russia could answer affirmatively only to the 1. and 7th questions. People in the West thought that an attack against Ukraine would be foolish, because Russia would suffer a major international backlash and because subjugating Ukraine would be very complicated. They were right and Russia is now stuck in a terrible mess.

Yet Russia still attacked Ukraine. It's unlikely that they were unable to foresee all the problems that later materialized in Ukraine and that the Western analysts were able to predict. Russians just didn't care about them. All holes in their plans were filled with wishful thinking and a belief that determination is the key to success.

Now Russia has entered the Syrian civil war. After initial dismay most Western analysts concluded that Russia is getting desperate and that Russia should be let to bleed dry in Syria. The Western analysis is correct, nothing good will come out of the intervention in Syria. Unfortunately this will make Russia even more dangerous.

The parallel universe

To understand why intervention in Syria makes Russia even more dangerous one must understand the parallel universe where the current Russian leadership lives. Russians think only great powers are truly independent and capable of free will. In the Russian mind Russia, China and United States are great powers while lesser states like Germany, Poland, Turkey or Estonia are just puppets, helpless subjects of Washington.

This doesn't make sense but things don't have to make sense to be believed in Moscow. Russians managed to convince themselves that in Ukraine they were actually fighting the Americans. Every time they killed a Ukrainian soldier they saw a dead American. Every time they destroyed a Ukrainian BTR they saw a destroyed American Humvee. That's the only way they could keep fighting that war in Ukraine and still sleep at night.

Most Americans would say that American presence in Syrian war is pretty limited and in addition to local actors Hezbollah, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey have a sizable and maybe even bigger presence. Yet Russians only see Americans every time they look at Assad's enemies in Syria. Russians even managed to convince themselves that Islamic State is an American creation.

On the 6th of October Russian ships on the Caspian sea launched a volley of Kalibr cruise missiles to Syria. Russian media was ecstatic and rejoiced that Americans were unable to see them: “We have found a breach in the American armor.” America might find it bizarre but Russians think they are fighting Americans in Syria.

The next war

Russians entered Syria when they got stuck in Ukraine and realized that war in Ukraine is no longer going to support the popularity of president Vladimir Putin. Intervention in Syria was meant to distract everybody from the mess in Ukraine. It won't take long until Russians are stuck in a mess in Syria as well. When this happens they will be looking for new targets.

A new target could be anywhere. After all, if they intervened in Syria Russians may just as well attack whomever. Yet there is a shortlist of most likely candidates. Georgia is pro western and weak, so doing something nasty to Georgia is very appealing to Russia. Belarus is weak, tries to resist Russian encroachment and has a strategic location in Eastern Europe.

A lot of people are really worried about a possible Russian attack against the Baltic states, because this means a war with NATO. I think people overestimate the danger of hybrid war in the Baltic states and for a conventional war Russia would need to control Belarus first, Yet it doesn't mean a Russian attack against the Baltic states is unlikely. Western analysts who think that are fooled by the Powell doctrine. Most wars don't start because they fit the demands of the Powell doctrine, they start, because one or both sides sees a strong political need to fight. The story of imperial Japan's attack against Pearl Harbor is in that respect very revealing and frightening.

Pearl Harbor

In 1941 Japan attacked the United States despite overwhelming odds against Japan.

How, in mid-1941, could Japan, militarily mired in China and seriously considering an opportunity for war with the Soviet Union, even think about yet another war, this one against a distant country with a 10-fold industrial superiority? The United States was not only stronger; it lay beyond Japan's military reach. The United States could out-produce Japan in every category of armaments as well as build weapons, such as long-range bombers, that Japan could not; and though Japan could fight a war in East Asia and the Western Pacific, it could not threaten the American homeland. In attacking Pearl Harbor, Japan elected to fight a geographically limited war against an enemy capable of waging a total war against the Japanese home islands themselves.

Japan attacked the US not because it had a good plan, but because they felt they had no alternative. US president Roosevelt had declared an oil embargo against Japan and demanded that Japan must retreat from Indochina and China.

Yet the embargo, far from deterring further Japanese aggression, prompted a Tokyo decision to invade Southeast Asia. By mid-1941 Japanese leaders believed that war with the United States was inevitable and that it was imperative to seize the Dutch East Indies, which offered a substitute for dependency on American oil. The attack on Pearl Harbor was essentially a flanking raid in support of the main event, which was the conquest of Malaya, Singapore, the Indies, and the Philippines.

There are more scary parallels with modern Russia.

Japan's decision for war rested on several assumptions, some realistic, others not. The first was that time was working against Japan--i.e., the longer they took to initiate war with the United States, the dimmer its prospects for success. The Japanese also assumed they had little chance of winning a protracted war with the United States but hoped they could force the Americans into a murderous, island-by-island slog across the Central and Southwestern Pacific that would eventually exhaust American will to fight on to total victory. The Japanese believed they were racially and spiritually superior to the Americans, whom they regarded as an effete, creature-comforted people divided by political factionalism and racial and class strife.

Now, does that sound similar? Does it sound like something you hear from Moscow? Does it sound like a belief that their back is against the wall but it doesn't matter because determination is all that matters?

What to look for?

So, once we are no longer looking for signs that Russia is ticking all the boxes of the Powell doctrine, what should we look for when we try to predict Russia's next move? Well, one thing we have seen both in Ukraine and Syria is that Putin really likes an element of surprise. He truly likes to see how everyone is trying to figure out what he's doing.

One way of surprising is starting a military campaign that simply seems to have no logic. Russians know that Western analysts think according to the Powell doctrine so starting a war that makes no sense according to that doctrine is a simple way of surprising the West. Unfortunately this means that an attack against the Baltic states is more likely than is usually thought.

To add to the element of surprise that attack would look weird, unconventional. If Western analysts are scratching their heads and thinking: "What are they doing? Nobody attacks like that" then Russians are satisfied. This probably means an attack with a small number of troops and at least some of them would be irregulars, just to confuse the situation.

Russia's plan in such a war would be to keep the West surprised and thus immobilized, while Russia adds more troops to the war theater and achieves her goals while the conflict turns more conventional with every day. Nuclear blackmail would play an important part in keeping the West paralyzed.

The most likely date for the new war would be next year during the traditional European fighting season from April to October. The most dangerous period would be in August and September before Russian parliamentary elections on September 18th. The land is dry in August and Western leaders are on vacation.

There are two more things that make the next year the most dangerous during this new cold war. Firstly, 2016 is the last year when Russia has money for such adventures, because by 2017 they are probably out of money. Secondly, 2016 is the last year of president Barack Obama, whom Putin despises. His perceived weakness will probably be an important part of the war plan.

What to do?

Russia's next step is impossible to predict because Russia seems to relish the idea of a surprise and can thus act very irrationally. Instead of predicting the West must prepare for all contingencies. This means strengthening all pro-western countries next to Russia with all means, including weapons.

The countries on the border themselves have a very important role to play. Russia expects them to wait for orders from Washington and thus the main goal of the Russian plan will be to jam Washington's decision making process while keeping their forces on the advance.

Baltic states are too weak to withstand a determined Russian attack but they are probably strong enough to deal with smaller threats. Surprising the West requires an attack with a small force that the Baltic states themselves could deal with. As I said, Russia doesn't think Baltic states are independent actors and thus doesn't plan for their independent action against Russian attack. So when the Baltic states would react immediately to the crisis with a determined push to get it under control without waiting for instructions from Washington or Brussels, then Russia would be surprised.

This article was originally published at my other blog.