Why ageing revolutionaries in Eastern Europe hate migrants, cyclists and vegetarians

Jaroslaw Kaczynski Photo: Piotr Drabik

Eastern Europe recently got a lot of bad press in the West because authoritarian and anti-liberal politicians won elections in one country after another and started rolling back the liberal political order, often with little opposition from the society. Then Donald Trump happened in the US and suddenly Eastern Europe doesn't look so bad. Yet it still needs an explanation why are we seeing such a backlash to a liberal, globalized world in Eastern Europe.

What we have here is a conflict between globalization and political transformation in Eastern Europe. After the Berlin Wall fell Eastern Europe experienced a transformation from communism to capitalism, from autocracy to democracy and from a closed society to an open society. The digital transformation also took place at the same time. Yet the most important transformation taking place in Eastern Europe now is one of globalization. The anti-liberal movement in Eastern Europe is mostly an anti-globalization movement.

The anticommunist revolutionaries in Eastern Europe probably didn't imagine that after communism their countries would become part of a globalized world. They often wanted to resurrect a pre-war conservative, agrarian society as they imagined it. This imagination was often very romanticized. Those revolutionaries also thought that their country should be a part of a wider Europe, but their understanding of that Europe was also very romanticized. Their knowledge of Western Europe often came from literature, like the Agatha Christie novels.

The post-communist reality came as a shock. The old, pre-war agrarian Eastern Europe didn't come back from the dead. The globalized, multicultural Western Europe also wasn't what the revolutionaries in Eastern Europe imagined it would be. Yet the revolutionaries, now in power, thought that they can strive to achieve Western level of prosperity without copying parts of their societies they didn't like. The revolutionaries said to their people that "we don't need to copy their every folly" and tried to forge a special path for their countries.

Yet over time weird things started happening in Eastern Europe. Young people started going to Africa to work as volunteers. One vegetarian restaurant was opened after another and they were followed by vegan restaurants. Young men started growing ridiculous looking beards and started cycling. Western follies started arriving to the East.

The aging revolutionaries started striking back. Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski told the German newspaper Bild:

The previous government carried out a leftist programme there (in the public media). It was as if the world was according to a Marxist model which has to automatically develop in one direction only - a new mixture of cultures and races, a world made up of cyclists and vegetarians who only use renewable energy and fight all forms of religion.

Waszczykowski railed against cyclists and vegetarians because they were already in Poland. He and his friends consider it to be a foreign, non-Polish import that has to be stopped. It's a culture war between a conservative and a globalized world.

In this culture war the Eastern European conservatives get most of their inspiration from American conservatives. Much is talked about Vladimir Putin's Russia's attempts to influence Europe with his anti-globalization, anti-liberal initiatives, but Russia's actual influence isn't that great. US has managed to supplant Russia's intellectual position in Eastern Europe in only a few decades. Eastern Europe is still influenced by old conservative ideas like dislike of homosexuality or anti-Semitism, that stem from the communist or pre-war time, but even there one can find similar influential ideas that stem from the US.

In 2015. the refugee crisis made anti-globalization the main issue in Eastern Europe. This region has won a lot from opening up to the world but the scope of change is just too fast for too many. The anti-globalization crowd is often described as the people who didn't get a piece of the growing prosperity of Eastern Europe. That's only partly true. While some people did lost big during the transformation, most people in that part of Eastern Europe that is now part of the European Union have now a much higher standard of living than 30 years before. That is also true of pensioners and low income workers.

The biggest reason for this anti-globalization movement is the cognitive difficulty of understanding modern world. The people who are now 50+ in Eastern Europe grew up and got their education in a very different world. After the transition they had to learn how to get by in a capitalist democracy. They had to learn to use computers, to speak English and to acquire all kinds of skills needed to thrive in this new world. For a grown-up this was hard, but most people managed to do it sufficiently well.

Yet their societies, instead of slowing down, started changing even faster. Instead of laying back and enjoying what they had achieved these middle-aged people were forced to witness discussions about gay marriage and accepting foreign refugees. Nothing in their lives had prepared them for those discussions. It looked like big change in society and previous experience had shown that big change in society is often problematic and sometimes outright dangerous. Being suspicious and resisting change seems for them like a wise stance.

For young people it's very different. They were raised in a new world and often know very little about communism. Young people have difficulty understanding why their societies are so much more conservative than Western societies. The young are impatient to move on much faster so that their societies would not only be as rich as the West, but also as liberal as the West. Of course that also means bicycle lanes, vegetarian restaurants, craft beer, other cultures, renewable energy and gay marriage. For the young, the East must have everything that the West has.

Not all old people in Eastern Europe are not conservative and not all young people are liberal, but there is definitely a serious generational fight taking place in Eastern Europe right now. This conflict gets very little coverage in the West, which is a pity, because the existing analysis in the West too often turns to some old atavistic impulses to explain Victor Orban or Jarosław Kaczyński.

Seeing the current turmoil in Eastern Europe as a fight of generations also tells us how it will end. The young, who are liberal, will win. No matter what the conservatives say - there is no deep cultural tradition behind conservative ideas in Eastern Europe. It's just a reaction to the world that is changing too fast.

Baltic states are bigger than you think

"Small", "tiny" or even "minuscule" are the adjectives often used to describe the Baltic states separately or even all of them together. It's true that in most respects those adjectives are correct, but when it comes to military defence, Baltic states are much bigger than you think.

Are Baltic states defensible, analysts often asked prior to their NATO accession. Recently two studies, one from Sweden and the other from Finland, raised the same question and they didn't think the Baltic states can defend themselves and neither can NATO help them. Nevertheless, I think they are too pessimistic. 

There is one nightmare scenario frightening everyone -- Russia suddenly attacks all three Baltic states, swiftly suppresses resistance, establishes a land connection to its Kaliningrad enclave and takes defensive positions against Poland in Southern Lithuania and in the Baltic coast against NATO navies. This would present NATO with a fait accompli, allowing Moscow to start negotiations from a position of strength.  But how likely is this scenario?

So how big are the Baltic states?

Russia has to invade suddenly to have a chance. This presents a serious problem for Russia. It has long borders and thus has to keep a large part of its forces in the Far East and in the Caucasian mountains. Only a part of its forces can be in Western Russia. But due to its huge size even the forces in Western Russia have to travel a long road before reaching Baltic borders. Logistics will be a big issue for Russia.

On the other hand Baltic states are much bigger than any war theater where Russia has fought during the last 20 years. Russia fought two difficult wars in Chechnya, but Baltic states have a combined population that is 6 times bigger that that of Chechnya and a territory 10 times as large. South Ossetia has the population and territory of a larger Estonian county, no more.

Occupying a region of about 6 million (mostly hostile) people requires plenty of infantry. To have one soldier for 100 inhabitants requires 60 000 troops and this is just for keeping the territory under control. Russia probably could gather this army, but it will take time and it's impossible to do it discreetly. 

So Russia can attack only with troops in the vicinity of Baltic states. We are talking about some brigades here, the amount of infantry that Russians have at their disposal is limited, but they have attack helicopters, earth-to-earth missiles, artillery, etc. Russians have plenty of firepower to overpower Baltic armies in a desert fight, but not enough to effectively control Baltic states for the initial days or even weeks.

How the Baltic states intend to defend themselves

But Baltic states are anything, but deserts. In fact, Estonia and Latvia are very wet places, full of swampland and thick forests. There are only some major roads and they often pass through forests, severely limiting the maneuverability of Russian armor. But without armor Russians don't have anything. Lithuania has a more open terrain, but in Lithuania population centers are bigger.

So even if there would be no resistance, Russians could only establish a few bases in all three countries, while most of the countryside and even some large towns would remain outside Russian control because Russians just don't have enough infantry to properly occupy these countries. Troops to establish Russian presence in smaller towns and villages have to be transported from other parts of Russia or even mobilized and it may take several weeks until they arrive.  

Armies of the Baltic states are not very strong, the three countries have made little actual plans for mutual defence and their defense solutions are also different. For example, Latvia is not really planning serious defence of its territory, Latvian soldiers don't even have suitable uniforms for Latvian climate, but use desert uniforms that are meant for Afghanistan. Estonia on the other hand is preparing mostly for defending its territory and has kept conscription, to allow swift mobilisation of soldiers in case of war. Official numbers are somewhat exaggerated, but Estonia still has the capacity to mobilize some 10-15  000 men, maybe up to 20 000 men. Their training and motivation are better than that of Russians, but there may be a shortage of both modern weapons and ammunition. 

I'm now assuming that Russians win all battles, but I still claim that victory won't be easy. Baltic states are just too big to be invaded rapidly. Blowing up bridges, laying mines and making small ambushes will be enough to slow Russian advance and to inflict casualties. The shortest roads from the Russian border to Tallinn and Riga are about 200 kilometers, and as I said before, there are only a very limited number of roads Russians can use. This makes stalling and blocking their advance quite easy without ever winning a battle. Clearing minefields, removing obstacles and fighting the defenders while they do it may take several days even if Russians win all battles.

There is of course the possibility of sending an air-born or sea-born invading party to take control of strategically important places like government offices in Tallinn or Riga. Nevertheless, Russians still have to establish a land connection to the invading force because otherwise they may remain stuck and get wiped out by local troops. And taking over some government quarters in capitals don't give power over the countries because all three countries are covered with units of local paramilitary organizations Kaitseliit, Zemessardze and KASP. These are also different in all countries, but they do establish a certain military presence in all corners of the Baltic states, making occupation of Baltic states very complicated. 

So let's imagine that after the Russians have reached Tallinn and Riga Estonian and Latvian troops manage to stop Russians for a few days. Russians will soon need to get more ammunition and supplies from Russia and to send the wounded and dead back to Russia. But the supply line is 200 kilometers long and in hostile territory.

This is where the importance of the paramilitary forces really become obvious. They are usually considered an auxiliary force by most foreign analysts, but local military planners give them a much more important role, and recently in Estonia also more money and better weapons.

Kaitseliit in Estonia has a penchant for small unit, guerrilla warfare not because military commanders want it (they don't), but because this is what the volunteer fighters prefer. But having plenty of small units of local men who know each other, terrain and are well armed is not something a foreign commander wants in its rear. Paramilitary units have the potential of making resupplying of troops fighting near Tallinn or Riga a very complicated business. Russians have a very limited amount of roads they can use, there are plenty of forests for paramilitaries to hide and plenty of bridges Russians have to protect. And the defensive units become themselves targets for paramilitaries, so those units can't be too small. It's anybodies guess how many troops Russians would need to secure the 200 km road from Narva to Tallinn, but believe it or not, we are already talking about strategic depth here.

How fast will help arrive?

There are some pessimistic estimates about how fast NATO could send help to Baltic states. One month, maybe even three months are the guesses. But it's probably too pessimistic. It may take a month or more to send a big military unit to Baltic states, but the Baltics are mostly in need of a strong navy and plenty of air-power.

Sweden has promised to help the Baltic states in case of an attack and from Swedish airfields allied jets could engage the Russians in a matter of days, maybe even hours. The same goes for Swedish navy and German navy isn't that far either. If allied jets and ships would clear the sky and the sea from Russians, then that would be pretty much the end of the war. This would allow the resupplying the Baltic troops and there would be little need for land troops, except maybe for some tanks.

Poland in the south

Estonia intends to fiercely defend itself, but the most important battles will take place in Southern Lithuania. Russians need to establish a land corridor from Kaliningrad to Belarus and there is only one road in Southern Lithuania for it. They need to capture it. In the town of Mariampole this road from Kaliningrad to Belarus crosses the only road from the Baltic states to Poland. Therefore, Mariampole is  strategically the most important point in the Baltic states.

But Mariampole is quite close to Poland. There's little doubt that the Polish would come to the aid of the Baltic countries and they have the military capabilities that far exceed anything the Baltic states have. So Russians also have to find resources to take on Poland. And all that without getting caught before they attack.

Frankly, I don't see how Russia could swiftly occupy the Baltic states and present NATO with a fait accompli. Baltic states are just too big for it.

This article was originally posted at my other blog in 2011.